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Nuclear energy has provided a major source of clean
electricity for South Korea over decades. However, the
South Korean Government announced an energy tran-
sition roadmap aiming to reduce nuclear shares and
increase renewable shares. However, given the nation's
high population density, the maximum share of
renewable sources for electricity generation in South
Korea is constrained. The roadmap was silent on how
to fill the gap between a reduced nuclear output and
the limited renewable potentials. The tacit alternatives
are fossil fuels, and their deployment will become the
key determining factor on how South Korea
approaches the problem of greenhouse gas emissions
reductions. We used scenario analysis to investigate
two fossil‐intensive cases, alongside a hypothetical
renewable case. On the basis of the comparison of the
three scenarios with other countries, we provide an
insight into the feasibility and limitations of the
nonnuclear options and propose the techno‐economic
requirements for avoiding the worst outcomes.
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HONG AND BROOK 5231 | UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION
IN SOUTH KOREA
Over the past few decades, nuclear power has provided the majority share of clean electricity in
South Korea and has been a bedrock of economic development. However, following a vigorous
public debate in that country on the merits of nuclear energy versus other forms of low‐carbon
electricity generation, a citizen's jury was appointed by the government to gauge public opinion
on the matter. On October 20, 2017, the jury released a decision that construction of two nuclear
reactors (Shin Kori 5 and 6) ought to continue through to completion but also recommended a
reduction in the nuclear share over the longer term by pursuing a higher future share of renew-
able energy (Office for Government Policy Coordination, 2017). Based on the citizen's jury
report (which is not legally binding), the government subsequently published an energy transi-
tion roadmap (hereafter “the roadmap”), which aimed to increase the share of renewable elec-
tricity generation in South Korea to 20% by 2030, up from 7% in 2017. The roadmap also
included terms that proposed prohibiting any licence extensions for existing nuclear power
plants and the cancellation of all construction proposals for any new nuclear reactors with
the goal of reducing the number of reactors to 14 by 2038 (compared with 24 in 2017, and 28
projected for 2022; Ministry of Trade Industry and Energy, 2017).
However, the roadmap was silent on a critical question: How will South Korea fill the gap
between the reduced nuclear and its physical constraints on renewable energy generation (Hong
& Brook, 2018) if the nation also intends to reduce carbon emissions from its electricity gener-
ation as per the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement (NRDC, 2015)? Currently, the generation gap
between the 30% nuclear and 7% renewable share is met almost entirely by fossil fuels (coal
40% and gas 22%). If fossil fuels replace nuclear, annual carbon emissions from electricity gen-
eration will increase substantially, whereas if growth in renewables serves only to replace
nuclear (as has occurred recently for Germany, Amelang, 2017; Reed, 2017), then emissions
reduction will stall. Considering the scale of economy and the current emissions profile of South
Korea, failing to meet its carbon‐reduction target will have a significant negative impact on the
global efforts (Normile, 2017). To answer these question, we speculate on three potential future
electricity mixes based on the roadmap and current conditions for South Korea. We then inves-
tigate the feasibility, limitations, and requirements of each case by comparing with other Orga-
nisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states.2 | CARBON EMISSION IN SOUTH KOREA
Annual carbon emissions in South Korea 2014 (the latest year with complete data) was 568 mil-
lion tonnes (Mt) of CO2, ranked fourth of 35 OECD member states following the United States
(5,176 Mt CO2), Japan, (1,189 Mt CO2), and Germany (723 Mt CO2; OECD, 2017); this is an
increase of 145% compared with 1990 levels. Turkey (142%) and Chile (158%) were only two
other OECD member states that experienced carbon emission rise to an equivalent extent (i.
e., >100% from 1990 to 2014). (By contrast, during those same 25 years, 18 OECD member states
reduced their annual carbon emissions.) The annual per capita carbon emissions of South Korea
were sixth in the world at 11.3 t person−1 following Luxembourg (16.6 t person−1), United States
(16.2 t person−1), Australia (15.8 t person−1), Canada (15.6 t person−1), and Estonia (13.3 t per-
son−1). South Korea recorded the highest per capita carbon‐emission growth (108%) between
1990 and 2014 among all OECD member states.
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sions to 37% below the business‐as‐usual level of 851 Mt CO2eq by 2030 (NRDC, 2015). Com-
pared with the goals of other OECD member states, such as European Union (40% below
1990 levels by 2030) and Japan (15% below 1990 levels by 2030, excluding land use and
land‐use change), the emissions‐reduction target of South Korea (81% above 1990 levels by
2030) is clearly not ambitious. If all countries were to adopt the same modest goals, then
global average temperatures would be anticipated to rise well above 2 °C compared with
the preindustrial period by 2050 (CAT, 2017). Indeed, even those collective carbon‐reduction
proposals submitted by the other OECD member states are not sufficient to limit the global
average temperature rise below the Paris Agreement level (1.5–2 °C; Hulme, 2016). Deeper
and more rapid emission cuts will be necessary to avoid potentially disastrous environmental
and economic problems (Figueres et al., 2017). We argue that to respond appropriately to
global benchmarks, South Korea—as one of the world's largest carbon emitters—must expect
to have stronger greenhouse gas emission reduction targets than at present. However, given
that nuclear power has provided emission‐free baseload power in South Korea, removing it
from the electricity portfolio is likely to make any such aspiration all but impossible to
achieve (Hong, Qvist, & Brook, 2018).3 | FUTURE ELECTRICITY MIXES
According to South Korea's draft 8th Electricity Generation Plan (Park, 2017), peak electricity
demand in 2038 is expected to be 113.5 GW, but peak‐generation capacity will need to be
138.5 GW to incorporate a reserve margin of 22%. If annual generation growth follows the peak
demand growth rate proportionally, then annual electricity demand will reach 609 TWh of in
2038, compared with 543 TWh in 2016 (KESIS, 2017). Note that this demand forecast does
not incorporate the potential electrification of transport sector (498 TWh of final energy in
2016).
The flagship goals of the roadmap are to achieve 20% renewables by 2030 and limiting the
total capacity of nuclear power to 16.4 GW by 2038 (Ministry of Trade Industry and Energy,
2017), the latter yielding about 136 TWh of final energy (assuming a capacity factor of 90%).1
If the renewable share continues to grow at the same rate thereafter, it will reach about 30%
(183 TWh) by 2038. Nuclear and renewables, together, would then provide about half of the
total annual electricity demand.
How, then, can the other half of the electricity‐demand equation be solved without an
expanded nuclear option? The only feasible options available on the market today are the two
fossil fuel‐based power sources (natural gas and coal), additional renewables, or some combina-
tion of these (Figure 1). Below, we analyse the two extreme cases to highlight the probable tech-
nological, economic, and environmental issues related to a future increasing fossil fuel share in
South Korea:
• Case 1 (similar to the current German solution): Annual generation of coal will remain at
current levels (214 TWh), and gas will meet peak demand (76 TWh).
• Case 2 (akin to the historical United Kingdom [UK] pathway): Gas becomes the major
source of electricity (290 TWh) and replaces coal power.16.1 GW * 8,760 (hours a year) * 0.95 = 50,765 GWh.
FIGURE 1 Electricity generation (terawatt hours, TWh) and share (%) of three hypothetical future scenarios
for South Korea, based on a mix of nuclear, renewables, coal, and gas, each for two‐time points (2038 and 2062),
with OECD analogies
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phase‐out, are two resolute objectives of a future electricity mix for South Korea, and gas
remains at the current level, then renewables will need to replace the entirety of coal
generation.
• Case 3 (the Swiss/Swedish pathway): Renewables become the major source of electricity
(352 TWh), and gas remains at current levels (121 TWh).
If the licence extensions for existing nuclear power plants are prohibited, and no new
nuclear power is constructed after the completion of Shin‐Kori 5 and 6 (scheduled for
2022, with a 40‐year lifespan), then South Korea should achieve a nuclear‐free electricity
mix by 2062. Predicting long‐term electricity demand is fraught with uncertainties due to
changing socio‐economic drivers such as demographic, industrial, technological, and other
behavioural changes. However, given that the future population of South Korea is not
expected to increase significantly over the long‐term future (Raftery, Li, Ševčíková, Gerland,
& Heilig, 2012), it is unlikely that its electricity demand increases substantially (unless electric
vehicles become ubiquitous). We therefore conservatively assume, for the purposes of this
analysis, that long‐term electricity demand will remain at the 2038 level (609 TWh) thereaf-
ter. Based on this demand profile, we extended our thought experiment to cover three poten-
tial future electricity mixes by 2062 (with the most similar/matching OECD country given in
brackets):
• Case 1 (Australia): Coal replaces nuclear whereas gas remains at 2038 level.
• Case 2 (Japan): Gas is the main source of electricity generation.
• Case 3 (New Zealand or Austria): Renewables are the main source of electricity generation,
and gas supports peak demand.
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The roadmap has a similar target with the German Energy Transition (“Energiewende”), which
seeks to close all nuclear reactors by 2022 and increase the share of renewable sources to by 80%
by 2050 (Amelang, 2017). For reference, renewables currently generate about 30% of the annual
electricity generation in Germany, with nuclear and coal at 14% and 44%, respectively
(International Energy Agency, 2017), with wind as the main source (40% of the total renewable
generation) of renewable electricity. Dispatchable renewable sources, such as hydroelectricity
(12%) and biomass/waste combustion (28%), also supply a large fraction of the renewable
electrical energy generated. Although Germany has spent €189 billion since 2000 to increase
renewables, the proportional share of coal share has not reduced and will remain in the
electricity generation portfolio through to 2050 (Amelang, 2017; Reed, 2017).
For Australia in 2015, coal (63%) was the main source of electricity, followed by gas (21%)
and renewables (14%). Although Australia's renewable shares are lower than the hypothetical
Case 1 for South Korea in 2062, Australia still arguably represents this case most closely,
because of its high share of coal and gas. Greenhouse gas emission intensities for Australia's
electricity sector (755 kg MWh−1 in 2015) is >40% higher than those of South Korea
(526 kg MWh−1 in 2015; IEA, 2017). Increasing the share of coal generation will also inevitably
lead to higher air pollution compared with nuclear, which have health risks and cause numer-
ous environmental problems (Hansen et al., 2013).
Given the lower construction costs of gas or traditional coal power plants compared with a
modern nuclear station, and with typically much shorter construction periods, fossil fuels can
readily replace nuclear. However, increasing carbon intensity is a major issue for Case 1 and
will lead to a failure to meet South Korea's agreed emissions‐reduction target. Carbon‐capture‐
and‐storage technologies are the potential saviour of this case, but its technological and
economic feasibility remains questionable (Leung, Caramanna, & Maroto‐Valer, 2014). Further,
replacing nuclear with coal will increase the electricity price slightly, given that nuclear power is
now the cheapest option in South Korea (KESIS, 2017). Higher renewable shares will increase
the electricity price due to the inherent high generation cost of renewables, especially when
considering balancing and storage needs (Alexander, James, & Richardson, 2015).5 | CASE 2: TOWARD JAPAN VIA THE UK
The natural gas share for electricity generation in the UK has increased rapidly since the 1990s
following the Thatcher‐driven coalmine closures and North Sea hydrocarbon expansion. Gas
had reached ~30% of its electricity generation by 2015, with nuclear at 21%. Although the UK
still has a higher reliance on coal than Case 2 (in 2038 for South Korea), in terms of total fossil
fuel and nuclear shares, this scenario resembles the UK situation in 2015. Following the
Fukushima Daiichi incident, Japan stopped all nuclear power plants, and fossil fuels, with an
increasing reliance on gas (now at 40% of electricity supply, with fossils fuels at 73% of the total),
illustrating a situation somewhat analogous to Case 2 for South Korea in 2062. At present, the
gas share of electricity generation in South Korea is much lower (22% in 2016) than the annual
gas generation projected for Case 2. However, given the currently low capacity factor of gas‐fired
power (41% in 2016) in South Korea (KESIS, 2017), a shorter construction time and lower over-
night costs than a nuclear power plant, a future focus on combined‐cycle gas plants and shift
away from nuclear (both 38% in 2038, and 70% gas in 2062) seems technically feasible.
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−1 for life‐cycle emis-
sions and 64.2 t CO2 TJ
−1 during generation) compared with coal (970 g CO2e kWh
−1 and
98.3 t CO2 TJ
−1, respectively; IPCC, 2006; NREL, 2017). Given that nuclear is a zero‐carbon‐
emission source at generation, a shift from nuclear to gas will cause a net increase in
greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation (e.g., the UK stands at 349 kg MWh−1 in
2015, with a lower nuclear, lower coal, and higher gas share than South Korea at
526 kg MWh−1). In contrast, post‐Fukushima Japan has slightly higher greenhouse gas intensi-
ties (540 kg MWh−1) than South Korea. A higher gas share of Japan lowered its greenhouse gas
intensities, despite a lower nuclear share.
One of the main motivations behind the antinuclear movement in South Korea is public fear
of nuclear accidents and their subsequent health effects. However, gas has a far worse safety
record than nuclear power, in South Korea (or indeed anywhere else). Compared with nuclear
power, which is yet to record a single fatality in South Korea, a gas explosion in Daegu killed
over 100 people (Associated Press, 1995). The price volatility of natural gas, which because of
its substantial influence of the levelised cost of gas‐derived electricity can lead to significant
electricity price fluctuations, is a major economic problem of gas‐based power systems (van
de Ven & Fouquet, 2017). The UK reduces this risk by sourcing 45% of their demand domesti-
cally (British Gas, 2016) and has Japan diversifies its import sources (EIA, 2017). Given that
South Korea does not have any domestic gas reserves, the entire gas demand for electricity gen-
eration must be imported. As such, high reliance on a single source with high price volatility
will clearly increase uncertainty in its economic condition.6 | CASE 3: TOWARD NEW ZEALAND OR AUSTRIA VIA
SWITZERLAND OR SWEDEN
Some OECD‐member states do have >60% of renewable shares, such as Iceland, Norway, New
Zealand, Austria, Canada, and Portugal. The maximum share of nonhydroelectric power is
about 57%, for Denmark. Given the renewable share (58% in 2038 and 80% in 2062), and nuclear
and gas shares of Case 3, either New Zealand or Austria might serve as an example for South
Korea by 2062, with Switzerland or Sweden a midrange example by 2038.
The major renewable source is hydroelectric power for both Austria (69% of the total
electricity consumption) and New Zealand (56%). The major hurdle of Case 3 is the technical
(or geographical) feasibility of renewable sources on the southern Korean peninsula. The
feasible maximum annual generation from renewable sources, including hydroelectric, wind,
solar, and bioenergy, has been estimated in prior modelling to be limited to 150 TWh (Hong,
Bradshaw, & Brook, 2013). Even if the generation efficiency of nonhydro renewable
technologies increases significantly (e.g., to 33% by 2038), the maximum potential annual
supply will still be no more than ~200 TWh. Therefore, supply 80% in 2062 (i.e., ~487 TWh), or
even 58% in 2038, from domestic renewable sources such as wind, solar, and hydroelectricity, is
completely unrealistic. Bioenergy can be produced, with fuel imported from foreign countries,
but bioenergy is not considered environmentally friendly in terms of either net greenhouse gas
emissions nor land use and associated ecosystem impacts (Manning, Taylor, & Hanley, 2015).
Even if the geographical limitation could hypothetically overcome, a high share of variable
renewables such as wind and solar will increase grid‐management and load‐balancing costs
including curtailment, frequency management, voltage regulation, and backup/storage costs
(Brouwer, van den Broek, Zappa, Turkenburg, & Faaij, 2016). The poor management of voltage
528 HONG AND BROOKand frequency control across electricity networks can cause a catastrophic blackout across the
entire grid, as was evident in the September 28, 2016 in South Australia (AEMO and Manitoba
HVDC Research Centre, 2017). Moreover, analysis has shown that as the share of variable
renewables climbs, there is a reduction in the usability of electricity so generated, due to
mismatches with electricity demand (Steinke, Wolfrum, & Hoffmann, 2013). As such, high
management costs, low capacity factors and usability, and high levelised costs of high‐
penetration renewable energy sources that includes full system costs will almost certainly
increase the average electricity price of South Korea in under Cases 3 and 6.7 | THERE ARE NO “NO REGRETS” CASES
Overall, Case 1 is environmentally disastrous due to its high greenhouse gas emissions and rise
in local air pollution levels. Although grid flexibility is higher than for Case 3, the higher renew-
able shares compared with the current situation might even become an issue for Case 1. Case 2
has lower greenhouse gas emissions than Case 1. However, under either of these scenarios,
South Korea will fail to decarbonise its electricity generation sector and so breach its interna-
tional climate commitments. A high gas share provides sufficient flexibility to the electricity grid
and will reduce the balancing problem outlined in Case 2. Although the overnight investment
costs for Case 2 is likely to be lowest among the three cases for 2038 (two decades hence), the
cost volatility of imported gas sources could lead to major economic problems. Case 3 is the
most environmentally friendly in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, but the geographical lim-
itations of renewable sources is a serious barrier that cannot be resolved by any current techno-
logical innovation or economic mechanism.
Moreover, about 1,792 PJ (498 TWh) of final energy demand for transport in 2016 was not
included in the demand projections (KESIS, 2017). Current oil‐based vehicle fuels will need to
be substituted, with either hydrogen fuel cells or battery‐powered electricity if South Korea is
to decarbonise its transport sector. Despite the potentially substantial increase in annual elec-
tricity demand due to a need to produce hydrogen (via electrolysis of water) or charging batte-
ries, the draft 8th Electricity Generation Plan did not include any assessment of the potential
impact of the increase. Under any of the Cases we examined, strong demand‐side energy effi-
ciency measures (technological improvement, economic incentives, etc.) would need to be intro-
duced to limit the future increases in electricity demand. A modelling study, which evaluated
the theoretical potential of renewables in South Korea (Hong et al., 2013), concluded that the
maximum annual production would be <150 TWh. Given the limited land area and high pop-
ulation density, but long coastline of South Korea, offshore renewable energy locations would
need mapping and assessment for potential exploitation.
Technological development in renewable energy has led to higher efficiency and lower
installation and management cost (Rubin, Azevedo, Jaramillo, & Yeh, 2015). Despite such
efforts and advances, however, a wind turbine cannot generate electricity in becalmed condi-
tions, and a solar panel cannot generate electricity at night or under cloudy skies. Energy stor-
age can provide multiple benefits to the electricity grid with high variable renewable
penetration, including as load shifting, demand‐side management, and voltage and frequency
control (Luo, Wang, Dooner, & Clarke, 2015). Due to the required scale and economic feasibil-
ity, pumped‐hydro storage has, to date, been the main form of energy storage deployed for use
in electricity‐grid management worldwide (Department of Energy, 2015). However, because the
geographically available locations for hydroelectric power and pumped‐hydro storage is already
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use pumped hydro storage systems is the only economically viable option at scale. Large‐scale
electrochemical energy storage systems can be commercialised, but their economic feasibility
at scale has not yet been proven (Luo et al., 2015).
It is therefore highly likely that, should the announced antinuclear policies prevail, the
future power mix of South Korea will be based principally on imported fossil fuels. Some
advanced coal‐fired power plants, such as integrated coal gasification combined cycle power
generation systems, offer a higher generation efficiency than conventional coal power plants
(Hoya & Fushimi, 2017). Currently, 300 MWe of integrated coal gasification combined cycle
is being operated in South Korea, with another 400 MWe plant under construction. Although
advanced coal power plants might lower the carbon emissions during combustion (approxi-
mately 85% of the emissions of equivalent conventional coal‐fired power plants) due to the
higher generation efficiency, carbon‐capture‐and‐storage technologies will be an essential com-
ponent for deep cuts to greenhouse gas emissions under a nuclear‐free future. Unfortunately,
given the technological and economic problems (and public concerns) facing carbon‐capture‐
and‐storage (Leung et al., 2014), it is unrealistic to expect commercialisation in the foreseeable
future. If it is not commercialised in a timely manner, it is virtually inevitable that South Korea
will not be able to decarbonise its entire energy sector even in the long‐term future.
Nuclear power can, if supported by policymakers and the public, overcome most (if not all)
of the technical problems that renewables and carbon capture and sequestration face. Nuclear
power in South Korea has historically recorded the highest level of reliability (>95% capacity
factor) and safety (0 fatalities) of any energy source; the lowest generation cost (it is cheaper
than coal [imported fuel] in South Korea, even including decommissioning and spent‐fuel‐man-
agement costs) and greenhouse gas emissions (40 g CO2e kWh
−1 for life‐cycle emissions and
0 t CO2 TJ
−1 during generation; Hong & Brook, 2018). Currently, the construction cost of
nuclear power in South Korea is reasonably low (<2010 US$ 3,000 kW−1) compared with other
western systems, due to a standardised manufacturing process and repeated builds of new
plants (Lovering, Yip, & Nordhaus, 2016). Technological development of nuclear reactors, in
contrast to renewable energy sources, bolds the promise of providing reliable, clean, and safe
energy, in the form of electricity, heat, and as a derivative: synthetic fuels (e.g., hydrogen; Brook,
Blees, Wigley, & Hong, 2018).8 | SOUTH KOREA 'S ELECTRICITY SECTOR AT THE
CROSSROADS
The electricity sector of South Korea stands at a crossroads, with four possible directions to
travel including a nuclear pathway. Unfortunately, one of these pathways (a high‐nuclear sce-
nario) now seems closed. The energy transition roadmap released in late 2017 by the South
Korean government did not consider long‐term energy‐deployment trajectories. Given the insuf-
ficient renewable potential of the Korean peninsula, coupled with an isolated grid network, high
population density, and intense economic activity, the road to a destination of high renewable
shares seems destined to traverse much rocky and hazardous terrain. As a consequence, South
Korea will also certainly end up following the path toward high‐density sources of fossil energy:
coal and gas. However, any such decision will increase greenhouse gas emissions and air pollu-
tion, substantially increase the nation's reliance on energy imports and lead to serious environ-
mental, economic, and social problems in the future.
530 HONG AND BROOKFortunately, South Korea still has time and sufficient capability to avoid this energy future.
It is one of a few countries to have built sufficient expertise, experience, and domestic
manufacturing facilities to be in a favourable position to expand its reliance on nuclear power
in the decades to come. However, the public unacceptance of nuclear power remains a barrier
to its large‐scale deployment. It is a political “hot potato,” with the (very) low probability but
high impact (economically and psychologically) incidents that have occurred in recent decades
in the former Soviet Union and Japan constituting the major challenge to the further deploy-
ment (Chung, 2018; Hasegawa et al., 2015; Miyazaki & Hayano, 2017). The public debate on
Shin Kori 5 and 6 was a good example of the importance of public education to overcome the
public unwillingness. Persistent efforts to engage the public in a dialogue about the nation's
energy future, based on logic, analogy, and scientific evidence, should provide more opportuni-
ties for nuclear power in South Korea. It is not too late to backtrack. South Korea can still recon-
sider its roadmap, and in doing so, set an example to the world on carbon mitigation.ORCID
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